Humans - are we glorified robots?: Intelligence without soul | Sunday Observer

Humans - are we glorified robots?: Intelligence without soul

15 January, 2017

If I live long enough, I might have to consider the prospect of having to live among zombies, or rather, keeping a zombie like robot as a dedicated personal companion in my old age. This is not a whim of my pure imagination, but a real possibility in the not too distant future. At the current rate of growth in robotic and computer technology the day might not be too far away when we have to deal with such intelligent beings, on a day to day basis. Already, autonomous domestic robots doing chores around and inside homes are commercially available, while vehicular and personal navigation devices are taken for granted.

Several luxury hotels in Japan are even planning to employ human-like robots as receptionists to welcome and assist guests. While the intelligence of these zombie like robots can range from rudimentary to fully sentient and emotional, their appearance ranges from mechanical to humanlike.

Although very advanced designs of robots in the future will closely resemble humans in every respect, these intelligent machines will always be considered as mere physical devices programmed to operate as discrete autonomous entities. Then again, am I also not a physical body programmed by my genetic code to function as a self-directed independent human being? What makes me different from a top-of-the-range humanlike intelligent machine? One might say, unlike robots, we humans possess this unique attribute of ‘mind’ which enables us to think and reason as self-directed individuals, differentiating us from any other intelligent device. More importantly, it is the mind of a human which signifies the existence of a non-physical ‘soul’ characterizing and personifying each individual by being extant over and above the physical body.

A physicalist with a materialistic view of the world, who maintains that all of reality is ultimately physical, would certainly disagree with such an opinion. For him, humans too are mere physical creatures, naturally programmed via the DNA sequence of their genome to act in a self-directed manner. A physicalist would not require an extra element of a ‘hypothetical mind’, or a ‘non-physical soul’, over and above the physical body to explain the fundamental character and nature of a person. Every action of a human, including all mental phenomena are interpreted by a physicalist as the outcomes of physical processes taking place inside a material brain.

If that be so, how could one defend the notion of a mind, or correspondingly and more importantly, the belief in the existence of a non-physical soul characterizing the self? Since soul is not something directly observable or perceptible through our ordinary senses, its existence cannot be established empirically. An advocate of soul trying to prove its veracity has no other option but to postulate its existence only by logical assertions of the kind we find in ‘abductive reasoning’. It is a method of reasoning by which one infers the truth of a certain hypothesis, based on the fact that the given hypothesis would provide the best explanation for the available evidence than would any other hypothesis. For example, Darwin inferred the hypothesis of natural selection, because, although it was not entailed by his biological evidence, natural selection provided the best explanation of that evidence. In a similar manner, an advocate of soul who may wish to defend the notion of soul can possibly postulate its existence ‘as an inference to the best explanation’ of some of the unique abilities of humans, such as thinking and reasoning.

Can a soul theorist make a valid argument using the ability to think and reason as an explanation for the existence of soul? It would not be a credible proposition today, since intelligent devices, such as, computers can perform the same tasks without a soul, but purely by physical means. For instance, a modern computer with sophisticated chess-playing programs simulates in its own unique way, not only the characteristics of thinking and reasoning, but also other human attributes, such as, having desires and intentions, and making plans to realize its own specific goals. A good chess-playing computer, or chess engine, can be thought of as having the ‘desire’ to defeat its opponent and ‘employ’ rational tactics to achieve its objective, while at the same time ‘learning’ from its mistakes and ‘memorizing’ them for future use. Contrary to popular belief that chess engines are programmed to make the best move from all possible combinations of future moves and counter moves–an impossible feat even with today’s best computing power – they are programmed to confront the opponent by constantly evaluating, planning and manoeuvring its moves like any other professional chess player. At least, to the limited extent of playing chess, chess engines behave like rational beings simulating all of the above human attributes of thinking, rationalizing, strategizing and memorizing, despite the lack of a non-physical soul.

It is thus evident that anyone advocating the presence of soul must therefore look for qualities other than thinking and reasoning to prove its existence. Perhaps, the fact that no physical device could ever have sensations, or feelings of emotions like humans, should be considered as a more promising justification to validate the soul’s existence. Emotions of fear, anger, hope, love and joy are just a few of a wide range of human emotions that a soul believer could indeed avail of, to posit the existence of soul, as an inference to the best explanation.

Can a soul theorist then make a compelling argument for the existence of soul by simply relying on human emotion which apparently has both an external, as well as, an internal quality about it? We know that human emotions are communicated ‘externally’ via associated bodily behaviour, such as, crying when sad, or smiling when happy. Combining these ‘outward expressions’ of emotions with bodily movements of robots, if necessary, is clearly a matter of physical implementation. But, the ‘internal’ quality of emotions in the form of conscious experience is something exclusive to human experience. The state of ‘what it feels like’ in our consciousness, also referred to as ‘qualia’ in philosophy, is still not clearly understood by the scientific community. Although the science of neuro-physics has made some significant headway in recent times, backed by a multi billion-dollar US initiative to map the human, it is nowhere close to solving it completely. We, on the other hand, have exceptional familiarity with qualitative aspects of emotions, or the internal sensations we experience as conscious feelings. It therefore, seems natural that a soul theorist could, after all, postulate the existence of soul as an inference to the best explanation for human consciousness, as no satisfactory explanation has been given by the physicalists.

Has the soul theorist finally made a conclusive argument with satisfactory reasoning for the existence of soul by resorting to human consciousness? It may appear to be so at once, but a closer analysis raises the question as to how ‘better’ this explanation has been, than any other explanation available for human consciousness. There is not really much of an explanation offered by the soul theorist as to its mechanism, or how ‘exactly’ a non-physical soul imparts consciousness. Accordingly, the reasoning based on consciousness offered by the soul theorist cannot be considered as confirmation for the existence of soul, unless having ‘not much of an explanation’ is better than ‘nothing at all’!

Despite all attempts to add soul to life, science will continue with its search for understanding the reality of our existence in physical terms. A soul theorist who needs to appeal for ‘soul’ to explain human behaviour will find the task increasingly difficult with the continuing progress in science and technology. If it turns out that we are truly without a defining ‘soul’, we will not have any apprehension with regard to a future phase of human life in the midst of intelligent robots. Maybe, in preparation for such an eventuality, it is time we set about looking at ourselves as glorified robots, just coded differently!

Dr.H.D.Goonetilleke 

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