From April 7 to mid-July 1994, between 800,000 and 1,000,000 Tutsi and moderate-Hutu Rwandans were massacred by government-sponsored militias consisting of, in some cases, their own neighbours. In an environment where rape, mutilation and sexual slavery were widespread, the United Nations (UN) estimates that nearly six men, women and children were murdered every minute of every hour of every day. That three-month period is known today as the Rwandan Genocide; an event associated by many with the failure of the UN and its peacekeeping department in their duty to ensure that an eventresembling the atrocities of World War II would never reoccur.
It can be argued, however, that accountability lies not with the UN as an institution but the Member States of which it is composed.
The United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) was established in 1993 and was initially meant to consist 2,500 peacekeepers. The UN Security Council (UNSC) resolution, however, did not include this and UNAMIR was sent into operation with only 1,400 personnel. Given that these peacekeepers were challenged with protecting civilians from nearly 100,000 Hutu militants, even 2,500 men does not seem sufficient.
In November 1993, approximately a month following the authorization of UNAMIR, the Force Commander of the mission, Romeo Dallaire, requested permission to use force if it became necessary. The Member States of the UNSC never formally approved the request, which subsequently led to the greatest failure of the mission. Following the commencement of the genocide, UNAMIR personnel were also targeted. In an effort to force Belgium, a former colonizer of Rwanda, to withdraw their troops from the mission, ten Belgian peacekeepers were surrounded by Hutu militants and were told to hand over their weapons. Unable to use force due to the UNSC not approving it, the peacekeepers surrendered their weapons and were then killed by the militants. Belgium eventually withdrew their military leaving UNAMIR with just a little over 270 personnel; hardly enough to execute a successful mission.
Although it is easy to blame the UN as an institution for the failure of UNAMIR, we must realize that it was largely the indecisiveness of Member States represented in the UNSC that prevented a successful mission, given that it is they who must authorize any expansion or action before the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) can pass on commands to its peacekeepers.
Member governments did not supply the mission with sufficient resources, and were indecisive in authorizing the use of force which prevented peacekeepers from defending themselves, let alone stopping the genocide. And despite the rapid extermination of ethnic populations, the UNSC stalled, and it is Member States that must be held accountable for the inaction and failure of UNAMIR.
Despite this and several studies conducted by think-tanks such as the RAND Corporation claiming that every two out of three peacekeeping missions succeed, the humanitarian disaster that took place in Rwanda twenty-four years ago is still one of the most frequently cited examples in the argument that the UN is an ineffective organization and UN peacekeeping is a failed concept.
So, is UN peacekeeping a failure? To answer that question, we must first address how peacekeeping missions are established and mandated, and then examine other regions to which the UN has deployed peacekeepers as each mission is specific in its purpose and its success also depends on the parties involved. Therefore, one cannot deem peacekeeping a failure or success on the basis of a single mission.
Following the authorization of a mission by the UNSC, the DPKO begins constructing a plan for the peacekeeping operation. Since the UN has no standing force or resources, Member States are called upon by the UN to contribute military personnel on a voluntary basis. The financing of peacekeeping missions is the collective responsibility of UN Member States, and decisions regarding the establishment, maintenance and expansion of missions are taken by the UNSC. According to the UN Charter, Member States are legally required to pay their respective share towards peacekeeping which is decided by the UN General Assembly, a collective of representatives from each of the UN’s 193 Member States, based on a formula which takes into account the relative economic wealth of each country among other factors.
While the peacekeeping force is being assembled, several diplomatic activities are undertaken by UN staff such as lobbying with the government of the nation in which the conflict is taking place as to the strength of the peacekeeping force being deployed. The ‘Rules of Engagement’, however, which gives the mission its mandate and scope, must be authorized by the governments represented in the UNSC. Once all necessary agreements are made between the respective participants, the Member States of the UNSC have to give one final vote of approval before peacekeepers are deployed to the region in question.
Therefore, the fact that it is up to UN Member States to decide the number of peacekeepers they contribute, combined with the fact that it is for the Member States of the UNSC to establish and authorize the mandate for peacekeeping missions, means that it is they who must take responsibility for the atrocities that occur due to inaction and insufficient resources.
When provided the necessary resources and funds, UN peacekeeping missions have proven to be successful. Since 1945, UN peacekeepers have undertaken over 60 missions and negotiated 172 peaceful settlements that have brought an end to regional conflicts, and enabled people in more than 45 countries to participate in free and fair elections.
In El Salvador, for example, UN peacekeepers served as trusted mediators in a place where trust was in short supply. They presided over elections in which the F.M.L.N., the party of the guerrilla insurgents, participated for the first time as a legitimate political party. UN personnel also supervised the demobilization of the guerrilla forces and the detested National Police, the training of a new civilian police force and the removal of human rights abusers from the armed forces. The UN peacekeeping force that operated in Sierra Leone from 1999 to 2005 is also hailed as a success. It was established with the task of implementing a peace agreement following the country’s devastating civil war and was able to do so. UN peacekeepers disarmed over 75,000 ex-militants, some of whom were child soldiers, and destroyed more than 42,000 weapons and 1.2 million rounds of ammunition in their effort to ensure the creation of a peaceful environment in the country.
More recently, we can look at the peacekeeping mission in Côte d’Ivoire, which concluded in 2017. In efforts to resolve the Ivorian crisis, the UNSC adopted various crisis management instruments including: diplomatic engagement through regional mediation efforts and the deployment of a regional force, the establishment of a commission of inquiry for human rights abuses and the establishment of a UN election certification mandate. And following a thirteen-year mission, peacekeepers were able to exit the country leaving behind a stable nation on the path to economic development, reconciliation and sustainable peace.
The UN, let alone the DPKO, is a heavily overstretched and underfunded organization, with an annual budget less than the amount of people in the United Kingdom spend on Christmas each year. What can be learned from failed missions such as in Rwanda is that Member States must show decisiveness and commitment financially and through the contribution of peacekeepers if UN missions are to be successful.
Despite a lack of funding and commitment from Member States, there has been a clear correlation between the decreasing number of civil wars and the increase in UN missions. The number of UN peacekeeping operations has increased by over 400 per cent since the conclusion of the Cold War. As this upsurge of international activism grew in scope and intensity through the 1990s and 2000s, the number of armed conflicts began to decline.
In conclusion, it is when national interest, insufficient funding and a lack of decisiveness from member governments of the UNSC hinder the operation of peacekeeping missions that they have proved to fail. UN peacekeeping may not be perfect and can definitely do more, however, it is a necessary and effective concept and when provided the correct resources and commitment by UN Member States operations can be successful in implementing self-sustaining peace in post-conflict regions that desperately require it.