On March 2, 2018, a personal dispute between a man and a group of youths in Sri Lanka’s central hills escalated into a week of communal violence. H.G. Kumarasinghe, a 41- year-old lorry driver, succumbed to injuries following an altercation with a group of four young men. Believing them to be Muslims, organised mobs launched widespread attacks, setting fire to Muslim homes, mosques and businesses across the Kandy district, including Katugastota, Menikhinna, Teldeniya, Poojapitiya and Pallekele. The violence claimed the life of Abdul Basith, a 24-year- old aspiring journalist, left many others injured and caused the destruction of property worth millions of rupees.
However, exactly seven years later, justice remains elusive for the victims as is the case with many other crimes and social injustices in Sri Lanka. Although the police arrested Amith Weerasinghe, the leader of the notorious hardline Sinhala nationalist group Mahason Balakaya along with several others for inciting the attacks, no convictions have been secured to date.
While victims of human rights violations often seek redress from the Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka (HRCSL) , the Commission’s inquiry report on the 2018 violence, an investigation it undertook itself, remains unpublished due to various delays. Speaking to the Sunday Observer, Commissioner Dr. Gehan Gunatilleke assured that the report would be released soon, following the inclusion of a short epilogue to provide better context to the findings originally compiled in 2018.
Pattern of attacks
As the public, including the victims, continues to wait for its official release, a draft version of the report obtained from the HRCSL through a Right to Information (RTI) request by a concerned citizen offers a detailed account of the violence that engulfed the Kandy district, spreading fear and devastation among its Muslim residents that fateful week.
The report presents findings of the inquiry conducted by the HRCSL from May 9 to 12, 2018 in Kandy where it gathered evidence, testimonies from victims, human rights activists, state officials and even suspects.
Offering insight into the country’s political and social climate at the time, the report in its preface importantly acknowledges that the violence that erupted on the night of March 4, 2018, in Digana and surrounding areas was symptomatic of a broader pattern of attacks against the Muslim community.
The HRCSL also noted that the trigger for violence, including in previous incidents such as those in Aluthgama, Gintota and Ampara, was “always” an ordinary event such as a traffic accident, where those involved belonged to different communities.
Initial police action
The report reveals that at least in the initial stages, police officials in the area appeared to recognise the potential for conflict and had taken measures to prevent escalation.
In fact, immediately after the altercation between Kumarasinghe and the group of youths, the Teldeniya Police had convened a meeting with Buddhist clergy and the local Muslim community in the area to inform them of the actions taken against the alleged assailants, aiming to prevent tensions from escalating and to deter external parties from inciting conflict in the village. Later in the day, the police had taken action to disperse a gathering of around 200 people who had assembled to protest Kumarasinghe’s death at the Moragahamula junction in Teldeniya.
Following this, additional discussions were held between the police, religious leaders, civil security committee members and others the same day to maintain peace in the area, particularly to keep outsiders at bay and prevent any acts of violence. A special police squad was also deployed at the Moragahamula junction by the authorities.
Despite these efforts, a group of youths had managed to gather and set fire to a Muslim owned shop at the Moragahamula junction around 9.30 pm, while the special police squad stood by. The youths were brazen enough to attack two police vehicles. Though the police failed to prevent the troubling incident, according to the HRCSL report 24 suspects, all residents of Udispattuwa, were arrested and remanded until March 19, 2018.
Taking further precautions, the Teldeniya Police had obtained a court order directing the Kumarasinghe family to conduct his final rites in the village on March 5, 2018, to prevent any attempts to move the ceremony elsewhere and provoke the masses.
It is also clear the police had identified potential troublemakers, as they had obtained a prohibition order against controversial Sinhala nationalist figures such as Ven. Galagoda Aththe Gnanasara Thera, Ven. Ampitiye Sumanarathana Thera and the Teldeniya Buddhist Association Secretary, T.B. Wijesinghe. In preparation for Kumarasinghe’s final rites, security had been strengthened with additional police officers on March 5.
Rapid escalation
The situation however had rapidly escalated following a visit by Ven. Ampitiye Sumanarathana Thera, Amith Weerasinghe of the Mahason Balakaya and several others to the Teldeniya Police Station on March 5 2018, who demanded the release of those involved in the March 3 incident. The Moragahamula incident was perhaps a sign of what was to come.
Their presence, coupled with a gathering of around 500 people in Teldeniya at 1:00 p.m. and a subsequent protest in Digana seemed to trigger a swift and uncontrollable decline in the situation. In the end, the fear and chaos that engulfed the Kandy district was brought under control only after 254 incidents of violence were reported within a span of just three days.
Police weaknesses
The HRCSL report underscores significant failures on the part of the police and law enforcement agencies.
One of the most alarming testimonies came from a victim who described how a mob of approximately 200 to 300 men stormed Digana town, while only three police officers and a single jeep were present to counter them. Despite a police barrier being in place, the mob disregarded it entirely and continued its rampage unchecked.
Numerous victims reported calling the emergency hotline, 119, only to receive no assistance. Although they were informed that police and STF personnel had been deployed, help arrived too late. For example, villagers from Endaruthenna, who had been hiding from the violence on March 6, contacted the hotline, yet police and STF forces only arrived after the destruction had already taken place.
Further testimony from the Poojapitiya Divisional Secretary highlighted the lack of police presence when businesses and homes were being set ablaze in Mullegama, with thousands gathered on the streets. This raises serious questions about where law enforcement was during these critical moments. Similarly, the Kundasale Divisional Secretary noted that the police were wholly unprepared for the unrest in Digana, leading to inadequate security and allowing mobs to gather unchecked.
The then Senior DIG of the Central Province, S.M. Wickramasinghe, provided insight into police actions, acknowledging that a Senior Superintendent of Police had been deployed to Kumarasinghe’s village in an attempt to prevent violence after reports of external forces attempting to incite disharmony. However, his testimony also exposed law enforcement’s reactive rather than proactive approach, arriving late at Moragahamula, where the first recorded act of violence occurred. The Senior DIG admitted reinforcements were delayed due to a failure to anticipate escalation, despite a clear understanding of a potential for conflict.
Further evidence of law enforcement’s shortcomings emerged on 5 March in Teldeniya, where police failed to disperse gathered mobs. A large group of persons evaded police detection and made their way to Digana from Menikhinna, Wattegama, and Balagolla. Wickramasinghe admitted that the police had not foreseen an incident in Digana, leaving the town vulnerable with only 35 police officers and 12 STF personnel present when violence erupted.
A similar failure occurred in Digana itself, where police once again refrained from dispersing the crowd, wrongly assuming they might move towards Teldeniya or Kandy instead. When stone throwing escalated into full scale violence, the overwhelmed police force was unable to restore order, leading to the intervention of the military and the imposition of curfew. Wickramasinghe conceded that the 2,000 strong mob vastly outnumbered the 50 police officers on duty, but he also suggested that low morale among rank-and-file officers may have affected their response.
Further exposing weaknesses in police preparedness, Wickramasinghe admitted to the HRCSL that he had to deploy two riot control units from Colombo 130 kilometres away, because Kandy police lacked adequate training in public order management, a fundamental skill for law enforcement officers.
Even on the final day of violence, law enforcement once again failed to anticipate further attacks, allowing a mob to wreak havoc in Poojapitiya. The HRCSL noted that adequate security was only established on 7 March, with the situation prior to this being deemed unsatisfactory.
One of the most concerning revelations from the inquiry was the failure of intelligence services to detect the imminent outbreak of violence and adequately warn the police and security forces. This intelligence gap significantly hampered law enforcement’s ability to provide protection, even with limited resources. The HRCSL ultimately concluded that the intelligence services must be strengthened to ensure public security is safeguarded effectively.
Extremist organisations
The HRCSL report also highlighted the alarming presence and influence of organisations and political parties such as the Mahason Balakaya promoting racist and extremist ideologies in Sri Lanka. While some of these organisations operated legally, others functioned without registration, propagating ethnic and religious intolerance with impunity.
The report stressed the urgent need for intelligence services to monitor these groups to prevent racial discrimination and segregation, particularly given their strong social media presence, which facilitated the spread of hate speech and extremist rhetoric.
In the aftermath of the Digana-Teldeniya violence, the police arrested Amith Weerasinghe, the founder of the extremist group Mahason Balakaya, which played a key role in inciting communal unrest. Despite credible evidence that this group had actively spread its extremist views through social media, authorities had previously failed to take any preventive measures. According to the HRCSL this negligence contributed to the escalation of violence in March 2018.
The HRCSL report troublingly pointed to the growing normalisation of pro-Sinhala Buddhist nationalist sentiments, exacerbated by the passivity of both the authorities and segments of society. This was reflected in the widespread display of vehicle stickers with slogans such as I am Buddhist and Sinha-Le, economic boycotts between Sinhalese and Muslim communities, and extremist gatherings around religious sites. Disturbingly, media reports also indicated that some groups altered the national flag by removing the colored stripes representing minorities.
Kandy fire brigade
The HRCSL report also casts a negative light on the fire brigade, highlighting its apparent lack of preparedness to handle large-scale fire incidents. Senior DIG Wickramasinghe, in his testimony, acknowledged that the fire brigade had been ill-equipped to respond effectively when called to extinguish fires in Moragahamula.
During its preliminary investigation, the HRCSL observed that the fire brigade had failed to deploy sufficient vehicles and resources to control the fires and limit the destruction. While this failure fuelled suspicion among the Muslim community that the inaction had been deliberate, the testimonies from fire brigade officers on May 12, 2018 had exposed a severe shortage of resources and personnel. The HRCSL concluded that had the fire brigade responded promptly and efficiently, the extent of the damage from the attacks could have been significantly reduced.
Social media and rumours
The HRCSL report also underscores the significant role that false rumours, mainly spread via social media, played in fuelling the violence that erupted in Kandy. It is clear that groups with vested interests exploited these platforms to organise and spread misinformation, inciting hatred and violence. One notable example highlighted in the report was the Chief Prelate of Kumarasinghe’s village, who emphasised the urgent need to quell these false rumours and the severe harm they were causing. Another human rights activist echoed this concern, stressing that the false allegations of sterilisation pills being mixed with food needed to be immediately dispelled, as they were inciting fear and violence.
The Divisional Secretary of Poojapitiya, for instance, pointed to the false rumour that the Chief Prelate of the Poojapitiya temple had been killed, which she believed could have been a direct result of these rapidly circulating false narratives. The spread of misinformation, such as the unfounded claims of sterilisation pills and the supposed economic superiority of Muslims, created an environment ripe for triggering violence, she had added.
Senior DIG Wickramasinghe also acknowledged the role of social media in organising these attacks. He confirmed that falsehoods propagated online were used to coordinate and incite the violence, underlining the power social media had in amplifying the situation. Meanwhile, disturbing images of Kumarasinghe’s lifeless body, along with CCTV footage of his attack, were disseminated across platforms, further inflaming tensions and encouraging violent actions.
In response to the violence, the Government took the controversial step of imposing restrictions on social media platforms, including Facebook, WhatsApp, Viber and Instagram, in an attempt to curb the spread of hate speech and prevent further violence. While this decision was widely criticised for stifling freedom of expression, the HRCSL report notes that both victims and law enforcement officials welcomed the restrictions. Many in the affected communities expressed relief, as the move helped stem the tide of misinformation and prevented the further escalation of violence in the immediate aftermath of the attacks.
Relevance of recommendations
The HRCSL report concluded that while the Teldeniya Police had acted promptly and lawfully in arresting those suspected of assaulting H.G. Kumarasinghe, false allegations of police inaction had been deliberately spread to incite violence.
The report also asserted that the subsequent attacks had not been spontaneous acts of grief or anger but rather a coordinated effort by extremist groups targeting the Muslim community. Although the police and STF had taken measures to prevent the violence, their failure to fully contain it was attributed by the HRCSL to shortcomings in intelligence gathering, limited resources, and an insufficient police force.
It noted that while some individual officers may have been complicit, the security forces as a whole had not facilitated or supported the violence. The report also highlighted the state’s failure to adequately strengthen the police force, which has played a crucial role in maintaining law and order during peacetime.
Though the HRCSL has provided numerous recommendations to state agencies at the time, seven years later, their relevance and implementation remains uncertain, raising concerns about whether the same systemic issues persists today.
Pix by Rukmal Gamage
