Sri Lanka is set to welcome another visit from Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in the first week of next month. This will mark the first visit by a world leader under President Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s National People’s Power (NPP) Government. Prime Minister Modi is expected to visit the sacred and ancient city of Anuradhapura, though sources said that his planned visit to Trincomalee is unlikely to take place.
India, under Modi’s leadership, has extended numerous infrastructure projects to post-war Sri Lanka. While Sri Lanka has benefited from some of these initiatives, its relationship with India has fluctuated depending on the ruling party in power and its political objectives. The Indian factor has been more politically instrumentalised in Sri Lanka than any other foreign influence.
Politicians have leveraged pro- and anti-Indian rhetoric for their own gain. However, India’s rapid economic growth, increasing influence in the global supply chain, China’s expanding interests in Sri Lanka, and New Delhi’s security concerns in the Indian Ocean are forcing Sri Lanka, with its population of 22 million, to reassess its stance towards its giant neighbour.
President
Anura Kumara Dissanayake
Prime Minister
Narendra Modi
Strategically located in the Indian Ocean, Sri Lanka has historically been a focal point in South Asia’s geopolitical landscape. The island nation has long been subject to competing interests, particularly from India and China, both of whom seek to strengthen their regional influence.
Sri Lanka’s political and economic trajectory has been shaped by its interactions with these two global powers. The election of Dissanayake to Presidency has added a new dimension to the country’s geopolitical outlook, as he must navigate the complex web of relationships with India and China.
President Dissanayake’s party, the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), has historically held an anti-Indian stance, particularly following the 1987 Indo-Lanka Accord. The JVP has consistently opposed Indian-backed projects in Sri Lanka, citing fears of ‘Indian expansionism.’ However, analysts suggest that the NPP Government has taken a more neutral stance on India compared to expectations of its foreign policy.
As a Left-wing party, the JVP has strongly opposed foreign interference in Sri Lanka’s domestic affairs. President Dissanayake’s ideology emphasizes national sovereignty and self-reliance, prioritising Sri Lanka’s independence from global power dynamics. His rise to the Presidency signals a shift in the country’s foreign relations, particularly concerning India and China.
The positions of Sri Lankan political parties, including the JVP, on India and China have been complex. While many politicians have vocally criticised Sri Lanka’s growing dependence on China—particularly regarding the controversial Hambantota Port deal, which has been labelled a debt trap—some have simultaneously sought to strengthen ties with Beijing. This delicate balance poses both opportunities and risks for Sri Lanka’s foreign policy.
Historical ties and contemporary tensions
Sri Lanka and India share deep-rooted historical, cultural, and economic ties. India has traditionally been a crucial ally, with both nations connected through maritime trade, historical interactions, and cultural exchanges. The Indian Ocean serves as a vital space for both countries, encompassing concerns from maritime security to the protection of trade routes.
For India, Sri Lanka’s geographical proximity and strategic position over crucial shipping lanes make it an essential regional partner. India has played a significant role in Sri Lanka’s modern history, particularly during the civil war (1983-2009), with its involvement in the peace process and military interventions shaping bilateral relations.
Tensions between the two nations have surfaced at various points in history. When Sri Lanka’s first Executive President, J.R. Jayewardene, leaned towards the United States in the late 1970s, India feared that Sri Lanka’s strategic port in Trincomalee might be used as a U.S. military base. At the time, India and the U.S. were engaged in Cold War tensions due to Washington’s alliances with China and Pakistan.
Sri Lanka had initially agreed to grant the Trincomalee tank farm development project to India due to concerns that the original bidders, a Singaporean firm, had ties to the United States. Jayewardene’s 1981 decision to lift the nine-year ban on foreign warships in Trincomalee further alarmed India, as the first vessels to enter were American. India feared that Trincomalee harbour could be converted into a covert U.S. naval base if New Delhi did not intervene. This concern, combined with ethnic tensions in Sri Lanka and political agitation in Tamil Nadu, prompted then-Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s administration to train Sri Lankan Tamil militants in South India. This marked the beginning of external support for militant groups, including the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).
The subsequent 26-year civil war devastated Sri Lanka. India, which lost Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in an LTTE suicide attack in 1991, later supported Sri Lanka’s efforts to eliminate the LTTE and played a crucial role in the war’s final phase.
Similarly, former President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s increasing closeness to China (2010-2014) came with consequences. His unexpected electoral defeat in 2015 had allegations of international influence in Sri Lanka’s political transition. Reports said that the Rajapaksa Government had expelled the Colombo Station Chief of India’s intelligence agency ahead of the election, accusing him of assisting the opposition. Rajapaksa himself later blamed India for his loss, underscoring how geopolitical rivalries can shape Sri Lanka’s domestic politics.
Growing Chinese influence
China’s role in Sri Lanka has expanded significantly, particularly under Mahinda Rajapaksa’s Presidency. Beijing has financed key infrastructure projects, including the Hambantota Port, the Colombo Port City project, and major highway and railway developments. These investments have been essential for Sri Lanka’s economic growth, especially as domestic resources have been stretched thin.
However, China’s influence has not come without controversy. The leasing of Hambantota Port to China for 99 years after Sri Lanka struggled to repay its loans has raised concerns about national sovereignty. Critics said that such agreements have increased Sri Lanka’s dependence on China, while India remains wary of Beijing’s growing regional presence. India sees China’s expanding influence as part of Beijing’s broader ‘String of Pearls’ strategy—a series of Chinese-funded ports encircling India’s maritime borders.
Despite this, President Dissanayake appears to be more comfortable with China than his predecessors. While publicly advocating for a diversified foreign policy, he has actively sought Chinese investments. His visit to China earlier this year highlighted Sri Lanka’s continued economic reliance on Beijing.
Sri Lanka’s pivot towards China can be understood within the context of its severe debt crisis. Foreign loans form a significant portion of Sri Lanka’s national debt, and China’s financial assistance has been a crucial lifeline. However, this dependency has come at the cost of Sri Lanka’s economic autonomy, leading to long-term strategic vulnerabilities.
The struggle for balance
Sri Lanka’s foreign policy has long been shaped by its need to balance India and China, two competing giants whose rivalry has placed the island nation in a difficult position. While Sri Lanka cannot afford to alienate India due to historical ties, security concerns, and economic opportunities, it also cannot resist China’s economic allure.
President Dissanayake has attempted to reassure India that Sri Lanka’s relationship with China will not come at the expense of its strategic partnership with New Delhi. However, China’s growing footprint in Sri Lanka’s infrastructure projects—often marked by a lack of transparency—has made it difficult for Dissanayake to completely distance himself from Beijing. As India adopts a more assertive stance on regional security, Sri Lanka finds itself navigating an increasingly precarious geopolitical landscape.
Dissanayake’s challenge reflects the broader struggles of smaller nations caught in the crossfire of global power rivalries. The extent to which he can successfully balance Sri Lanka’s relationships with India and China will define the country’s future trajectory. While difficult, this balancing act is inevitable if Sri Lanka is to maintain its sovereignty and strategic autonomy in an ever-changing geopolitical environment.
