Political analyst and former diplomat Dayan Jayatilleka, in an in-depth interview with the Sunday Observer, shares his take on India-Sri Lanka relations as Prime Minister Narendra Modi visits Colombo. He raises serious concerns about Sri Lanka’s growing dependence on India in key sectors such as energy, infrastructure, and defence, warning that such entanglements could undermine the island’s autonomy and strategic space. Jayatilleka also called for a more balanced foreign policy, urging Sri Lanka to diversify its partnerships and remain neutral amid intensifying India- China-US rivalries.
Q: How would you characterise the present state of India-Sri Lanka relations, especially in the context of Prime Minister Modi’s visit?
A: The present state of Indo-Lanka relations is very good, though not entirely devoid of problems. I refer to the piratical encroachment by Tamil Nadu fishermen on Sri Lanka’s waters and large-scale robbery of our fishing resources, which the Indian side seems unable or unwilling to stop.
Q: Prime Minister Modi’s visit comes amid increased Chinese investments and setbacks in high-profile Indian projects such as those involving the Adani Group. In your view, what strategic or diplomatic objectives might Modi be aiming to achieve through this visit?
A: We would be able to tell for sure only after having studied the pacts or agreements that are due to be signed, but from what I can discern so far, India seems keen on integrating Sri Lanka — locking the island into a multi-dimensional relationship of dependency, in terms of energy, infrastructure, and defence, to mention three domains.
Q: As you said, India has been actively involved in infrastructure and energy projects, including renewable energy in Sri Lanka. How should Sri Lanka manage these engagements to ensure transparency and maximum benefit?
A: The BBC reported that the Adani company fully restored electricity to Bangladesh after four months, after it had been cut down by 50 percent due to non-payment of bills. Meanwhile, we have the glaring examples of Canada and Mexico which have been shocked by the tariffs imposed by their giant neighbour, the USA. Several European countries are reviewing their orders of the US-built F-35 jets over fears that the US has built in a kill switch into their military exports.
All these go to show the extreme unwisdom of dependency in vital sectors such as energy on one’s neighbour. What if hostility towards Sri Lanka in Tamil Nadu forces Delhi into taking a tough stand against us? We should never put almost all our eggs into our neighbour’s basket. Instead, we should diversify our dependence and reduce our strategic vulnerability.
Q: You said India is keen on “locking the island into a multi-dimensional relationship of dependency.” What are the implications of this for our autonomy?
A: The implications are best set out in a speech to the Retired Military Collective in August 2023 by President Anura Kumara Dissanayake. I quote: “Ranil Wickremesinghe went to India. He arrived at a certain Memorandum of Understanding. What is the agreement that Ranil Wickremesinghe signed? A country that is connected with India by electricity cables; a country connected with India by oil and gas pipelines; a country connected with India by currency units; a people’s connected with India by cultural connectivity; a country connected with India by air, sea and land! What will happen? Isn’t there a question? There is a question!
On what basis must we have transactions with any country? We must have the freedom to freely move our hands and legs. But with this agreement, we will be in a situation where we are unable — isn’t that so? — to take any political or economic decision apart from India!”
This does not talk about the military dimension, still less any kind of defence cooperation pact. Obviously, that would have much deeper, more dangerous implications, given the extreme asymmetry between the two countries and the rising tensions between the USA, with which India is a strategic partner, and China.
Simply put, when there are contradictions between one’s closest neighbour and one’s closest friend, why should we tie up militarily with either one, instead of striving for balance and equilibrium in our relationships with them — and try to contribute to an equation of equilibrium between them?
Do we really want to enter a defence pact with our neighbour who is in a defence equation with the USA, which has stationed six B-2 bombers in Diego Garcia as a prelude to a likely attack on Iran, another friend of Sri Lanka?
Let me put it simply and, I confess, a little flippantly: If we sign this plethora of pacts with India, especially in the defence domain, we shall be getting married to India. India is strategically polygamous just as it is pantheistic, but a small state such as Sri Lanka cannot afford to be so. If we are married to India, we cannot maintain the autonomous relationships we’ve had since 1948 with both India and China. Worse, we will be seen in the world as a satellite or satrapy — a client state — of India, rather than the autonomous and often respected actor we once were. We will become a semi-colony, partly reversing what we obtained at Independence in 1948.
Q: Reports suggest that defence agreements may indeed be on the agenda during Modi’s visit. Obviously, you are concerned about closer defence collaboration with India. My question is, how might China perceive this, and what implications could this have for regional stability?
A: I am totally for military relations all around the compass with all countries but am totally opposed to a military pact with any external power, which elevates that relationship above all others. To put it differently, I am for ‘thin’ defence and security arrangements with everyone, but against ‘thick’ relationships with anyone in particular.
India is a member of the Quad which is aimed at China. India will sign a 10-year military agreement with the USA, which regards China as its main global adversary. If Sri Lanka enters a defence pact or comprehensive (‘thick’) defence agreement with India, we shall be aligning with one side — against China.
This is profoundly counterproductive and irrational in that China poses no threat to us and has been a firm friend through thick and thin. Why should we plug into one side against our richest and most powerful friend? Why should we tie up with India when one of its most influential states, Tamil Nadu, is utterly hostile to Sri Lanka and will always have an influence on Delhi — just as Florida has on Washington DC?
Q: How important is Modi’s visit in terms of India’s strategic interests in South Asia, particularly in balancing China’s influence, considering India’s limited allies in the region?
A: India has an explicit interest in balancing or containing China. The relationship with Sri Lanka is doubtless viewed also in that light. But India’s strategic interest is not ours, just as China’s strategic interest is not ours — though our interests may coincide with those of India or China or both, on certain issues and at certain times.
Sri Lanka has no interest in “balancing China’s influence” because China poses no threat to us and is, in fact, a useful counterweight for us against any hegemonistic impulses from anyone. This doesn’t mean we must lean towards China to counter India. What it means is that we must balance between the two — be close friends with both, but not at the expense of one over the other.
Q: There have been longstanding issues, such as the fishermen disputes between India and Sri Lanka as well as the Kachchathivu Island. Do you believe these issues will be addressed effectively during Modi’s visit?
A: If President Dissanayake and his team take a clear, firm, and persuasive stand in defence of Sri Lanka’s longstanding, legitimate rights, I am sure headway can be made.
Q: Do you foresee the Tamil minority issue and reconciliation processes featuring significantly during Modi’s discussions with Sri Lankan leaders?
A: I doubt that. New Delhi is more interested in real estate and strategic assets than Tamil rights and devolution. The Tamil parties themselves seem keener on matters other than rights and devolution — chiefly wartime accountability. There’s been a paradigm shift, and maybe a tectonic shift.
Q: You also said we need to diversify our dependence and reduce our strategic vulnerability. How do you propose we do this in a world marked by increased geopolitical tensions?
A: The repeated votes in the UN General Assembly on the Russia-Ukraine issue clearly reveal that a large number of countries —mostly from the Global South plus China — are abstaining and refusing to take sides. This is the zone we belong to and the zone we must remain within.
More specifically, we have the rise of BRICS and its expansion into BRICS Plus. Instead of absenting itself from the last Summit, our President, Prime Minister, or Foreign Minister should have attended and participated vigorously. BRICS Plus — and the New Development Bank — provide real possibilities for diversifying our dependence.
Q: US President Donald Trump imposed a 44 percent tax on our exports to the US, which is a significant blow to our economy. How do we counter the new tariffs imposed on the world by the USA?
A: We need to think differently. We need a strategy of diversification of dependence and “collective self-reliance,” as they used to say in the 1990s. We need new markets. We need a leap forward in South-South relations, and above all, in common Asian solutions. We need to push for an Asian Economic Architecture and an Asian Economic Space — including an Asian Common Market.
We can’t really do that if we tie ourselves to the chariot wheels of one Asian power which is allied with an extra-regional superpower that regards China, the global power produced by Asia, as its adversary.
Q: Looking ahead, what strategies should Sri Lanka adopt to optimise its relationship with India while safeguarding its national interests and sovereignty?
A: Sri Lanka must adopt the enlightened policy that any smaller country on the doorstep of a large neighbour would and does. An example would be Vietnam, China’s neighbour. I suggest a three-point doctrine. Call it the ‘DJ Doctrine’:
Sri Lanka must be India’s closest and sincere friend while always being Sri Lanka’s own best friend. Our core existential imperatives and strategic and security interests must never be sacrificed for anyone’s friendship, patronage, or munificence.
(II) We must never betray ourselves or sell ourselves out. Protecting this island — our patrimony — is our sacred task, duty, and responsibility.
(III) This requires balancing two considerations: on the one hand, remaining mindful of India’s security interests and perceptions, and on the other, maintaining firm ties with all those who can help us counterbalance any hegemonistic impulses or compulsions from our closest neighbour.
